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THE APORIAS OF DE ANIMA Γ 4. 429b22-430a9
John Driscoll 
San Francisco State University 
March 2 7 ,1 9 8 7 , San Francisco
In Book Γ of the De Anima Aristotle introduces the assumption that mind is, as described by Anaxagoras, 
"without mixture” (4 29a18 ),1 later restating it in his own terms as the view that mind is simple and απαθές 
and without anything in common with anything else ( 429b23-24). After discussing mind as a capacity of the soul 
in part on the basis of this view through much of our Chapter Four (429al 8 -b9), Aristotle proceeds to question 
whether the Anaxagorean Assumption ( "AA“), when conjoined with other fundamental assumptions, permits a 
coherent account of mind ( νους) and thinking ( νοειν). He states two aporias:
άπορήσειε 22
8* αν n s ,  e i ó voûs άπλουν έσ τ ι και άπαθες και μ ηθεν ι 
μηθεν ε χ ε ι κοινόν, ώσπερ φησιν ‘Αναξαγόρας, πώς νοήσει, ε ί  τό 
νοείν  π ά σ χε ιν  τ ί  εσ τ ιν  (ξ γάρ τ ι  κοινόν άμφόιν υπάρχει, το  25
μεν π ο ιε ΐν  δοκει τό 8ε πάσχειν), ε τ ι  8* el νοητός και αυτός; 
ή  γαρ τ ό ΐς  άλλο ις νους υπάρξει, ε ί  μή κατ' άλλο αυτός 
νοητός, εν  δε τ ι  τό  νοητόν ε ιδ ε ι, ή  μεμιγμενον τ ι  εξει, δ
π ο ιε ί νοητόν αυτόν ώσπερ τάλλα. (429b22-29)2 29
In Hicks' translation:
The question might arise, assuming that the mind is something simple and impassive and, in the 
words of Anaxagores, has nothing in common with anything else, how will it think, if to think is to be 
acted upon? For it is in so far as two things have something in common that the one of them is 
supposed to act and the other to be acted upon. Again, cen mind itself be its own object? For then 
either its other objects will heve mind in them, if it is not through something else... that mind is 
capable of being thought, and if to be so capeble is everywhere specifically one and the same; or else 
the mind will have some ingredient in its composition which makes it, like the rest, an object of
thought.3
How, Aristotle asks, will thinking be possible under the assumptions stated, and how can mind itself be an object of 
thought? He then stetes two important theses of his own: that while mind is its objects potentially it is nothing in 
actuality until thinking occurs ( 4 2 9 b 3 0 -3 1 ) and that in the C8se of things without matter what thinks is the same 
as what is thought ( 430a3- 4).
That Aristotle regards these theses as the key to resolving the aporias and that they do in fact permit a 
resolution of some sort, there is general agreement. As to the fate of the Anaxagorean assumption within the 
resolution, however, and hence as to the exact nature of the resolution itself, opinion is divided. After being
defended early in the Twentieth Century by Rodier ( 1900) and Hicks ( 1907),4 Aristotle’s commitment to the
1 Cf. Anaxagoras fragment B 12 ( DK)... νσύς... μ εμεικτα ι ούδενι χρήματι.... It is, of course, not the 
historical Anaxagores but Aristotle’s understanding of him ( cf. esp. De An. A 2 , 404a25-b6 , 405a 13-19, b 11 -  
23) which is of concern in the present context.
2 I will use Ross’s OCT text (Oxford, 1956).
3 Aristotle: De Anima, with translation, introduction end notes by R.D. Hicks (Cambridge, 1907), p. 133. After 
"if it is not through something else,” Hicks inserts, by way of interpretation, “but of itself."
4 Aristote: Traité de l'ame. traduit et annoté par G. Rodier, 2 vols. ( Paris: Leroux, 1900), pp. 460-463 ; 
Hicks, pp. 494 ,502 .
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Anaxagorean assumption has been questioned by Ross in his commentary on Γ 4 ( 1961 )5 and--for different
reasons--by Michael Wedin in an important recent article ( 1986).6 In this paper, by addressing in turn the 
various arguments of Ross and Wedin against the AA, I will try  to develop a position which incorporates their 
important insights into the aporiaand resolution passages (4 2 9 b 2 2 -29 and 429b29-430a9) and which is less 
vulnerable than those of Rodier and Hicks to Wedin's argument that Aristotle rejected the AA for potential mind 
(the νονς δυνάμει of 4 2 9 b 3 0 -3 1 ). The discussion will be kept as close as possible to the text of Γ 4, although 
occasional detours into Γ 5 and subsequent chapters w ill, of course, be unavoidable. While it is obvious that a 
short paper like this cannot contain a complete account of Aristotle's doctrine of mind in ße Anima Γ, I should 
stress that I will not even try  to give a full treatment of 429b22-430a9, one that addresses the many difficult 
questions reised by the positions Aristotle takes in the pessage. Rather, I wish simply to argue for an additional 
constraint on eny such account or treatment, that it recognize Aristotle’s commitment to the AA for potential mind 
(4 2 9 b 3 0 -3 1 ) as well as for actual mind, mind actually thinking (430a3-5).
SI . Ross's Case against the Anaxagorean Assumption
Ross contends that both of the aporias at 429b22-29 are directed against the AA. Using “reason'' for voOç 
and ''knowing" for νοείν , he summarizes the first aporia ( b 2 2 -26) as follows:
A's first argument ( 11.24-26) aims at showing that reason, thought of es Anaxagoras thinks of it, 
cannot know anything. This it cannot, because knowing is a being acted on, and involves a community 
of nature between the knower and the known, while Anaxagoras says reeson is not acted on, and hes no
community of nature with anything else.7
As Ross's paraphrase indicates, the first aporia may be analyzed into two strands, each of which provokes the 
question how thinking will be possible given both the AA and the thesis (P ), introduced as one disjunct of an 
apodosis at 429a 14, that to think is a case of τιάσχειν τ ι  ( “being acted upon"). Thus we get two sub-problems:
la. How will thinking be possible if mind is άτιαθές (AA) but thinking is a case of τιάσχειν τ ι  
(P )?
lb. How will thinking be possible if mind has nothing in common with anything else (AA) but 
thinking, as a case of being acted upon ( P), involves something common both to what acts and to 
what is acted upon ( Ross's “known” and "knower" respectively, cf. τιάσχειν τ ι  υπό του
νοητοί), 429a 14)?
In his comments on the resolution passage Ross says nothing about la. With regard to lb , he construes 4 2 9 b 3 0 -3 1 
( “...mind is potentially in some way the objects of thought [τα  νοητά]“) as evidence for his view that aporia lb 
aims at showing that under the AA mind cannot know anything:
One of Anaxagoras' assumptions was that reason has nothing in common with anything else ( 11.23- 
24). A. points out that in fact reason has something in common with its objects, being potentially
what they are actually.8
However this argument has a serious weakness. I n De Anima A Aristotle reads Anaxagoras es denying 
anything in common between mind and "other things" such es elements like fire or air ( 405b 13-23), and after 
introducing the AA at the beginning of Γ 4 he ergues that mind cennot be "mixed" with body since if it were it could 
be qualified as cold or hot ( 429a24-26). Given the distinction made in the resolution of the second aporia between
5 Aristotle: De Anima, edited with introduction and commentary by W.D. Ross (Oxford, 1961 ), pp. 294-295.
6 Michael V. Wedin, "Tracking Aristotle's Nous," in Human Nature and Natural Knowledoe. ed. A. Donagen, A.N. 
Perovich, J r . , and M.V. Wedin ( Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), pp. 167-197, esp. pp. 183-185.
7 Ross, p .294 , italics removed.
8 Ibid.
3things having matter ( 430a6) and things without matter (a 3 ) , elements and bodies clearly fall on the side of 
things having matter, which areonly potential objects of thought (a6-7). On the other hand, it is only things 
without matter that are the actual objects of thought which mind is the same es when actually thinking (a3-4). 
Since τα  νοητά  at 429b30 cannot refer to the material potential objects of thought (on that reading 4 2 9 b 3 0 -3 1 
would imply that mind is potentially in some way a tree or a stone, which is ebsurd; cf. Γ 8 ,431  b26 -29 ), it must 
refer to actual objects of thought without matter (430β3-4), i.e. essences or Aristotelian forms ( 8 , 431b28).
But on the latter reading the key δ τ ι  clause at 4 2 9 b 3 0 -3 1 says only that mind prior to thinking ( "potential 
mind") is potentially those immaterial forms which mind actually thinking ( "actual mind") is the seme as. Hence 
in the special sense of κοινόν τ ι  adopted by Ross, following Hicks and Brentano (that two things have something In 
common when one is potentially what the other is actually, cf. B 5 ,4 1 7b2-7), the δ τ ι  clause at 429b30-31 
supports only the conclusion that there is something common between potential mind and the immaterial forms 
which actual mind 1s"the same" as, not the stronger conclusion that there is something common between potential 
mind and materiel objects "other" than mind which Aristotle sees Anaxagoras as having rejected (A 2 , 405b21 ; cf. 
Γ 4 ,429820). Ross does not draw this stronger conclusion, but without it 429b30-31 does not show that under 
the AA mind "cannot know anything" ( i.e. cannot think anything), as he maintains--only that it cannot think as 
actual νοητά  anything other than those immaterial forms which it is the same as when it thinks. In other words, 
the possibility is open that Aristotle states aporia lb not to discredit the AA but to call attention to a question which 
he feels Anaxagoras had failed to answer- -  How, under the AA, can thinking take place (A 2 , 405b21 ; compare Γ 4,
4 2 9 b 2 4 )? -- a question which cen be answered, he believes, only by appeal to his own theory of mind and 
thinking.
As with the first, Ross considers the second apbria to be a direct attack on the AA, though on different 
grounds: "A's second argument ( 11.26-29) aims at showing that reason, thought of es Anaxagoras thought of it,
cannot be known."9 His interpretation is based on the logic of the second aporia, which hes been analyzed in detail 
by Hicks as a reductio containing a destructive dilemma:
If νου? is νοητό?, two alternative hypotheses are conceivable: it is νοητός either ( 1 ) καθ' 
αυτόν, οΰ κατ' άλλο τ ι  or ( 2) κατ' άλλο τ ι, σύ καθ' αυτόν. The first hypothesis, expanded in the 
clause b27 et μή κατ' άλλο... 28 ε ΐδ ε ι leads to the conclusion of the lemma, "all νοητά will have 
νοΰ? predicable of them," "all objects of thought will themselves think: cf. Plato, Perm. 132C εκ 
νοημάτων έκαστον ε ίν α ι και πά ντα  νοειν. Though A. does not say so, this result is paradoxical.
The Consequence to which the second hypothesis leads is contained in the clause b28 η 
μεμειγμένον... 29 τάλλα , "νοΰ? will have in it an admixture of something, alien to its own nature, 
which renders it νοητό? "... In that case this something else, which makes mind [νο η τό ?], must be 
regarded as a foreign admixture, and thus the condition laid down by Anaxagoras..., that mind is 
ά μ ιγη ? , is violated.10
In order to establish that the aporia is intended to be resolved by repudiation of the AA, Ross must show that 
Aristotle accepts the "consequence to which the second hypothesis leads" ( in Hicks' terminology), i.e. refuses to 
perform the modus tollens step in the second horn of the destructive dilemma, since any other way of blocking the 
aporia would fail to contradict the AA. In other words, Ross must find in the resolution of the second aporie some 
evidence that on Aristotle's own view mind will have in it β μεμ ιγμενον, “an admixture of something... alien to its 
own nature" (Hicks), i.e. in Ross’s own terms, that mind "will heve in it some element which makes it... [νοητό?] 
just as other things are." Ross appears to find this evidence in Aristotle's key thesis that among things without 
matter what is thinking is the same as what is being thought ( 430a3-4):
A. turns now to the second of the questions raised in 429b22- 29 ( ε ί νοητό? και αυτό?). Reason is 
known, he says, just es its objects ere known, since in the cese of immaterial things that which knows 
and that which is known are the same. He does not explain this saying, but we must suppose him to
9 m
10 Hicks, p. 494.
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mean that when one is really knowing, the nature of that which is being known is exactly reflected in 
the mind of the knower, his mind exercising no disturbing influence.11
Thus the supposed μεμ ιγμένον in Aristotle’s own account of mind, needed to establish the anti-AA reading of the 
second aporia, would seem to be the reflection "in the mind of the knower" of the nature of an actual object of 
thought.
It is important to note that Ross here is talking about actual mind, mind actually thinking an actual object of 
thought. Early in Γ 4 Aristotle argues, in part on the basis of the AA, that, in order to be able to think all things 
without obtruding any (actual) nature of its own, potential mind must be nothing in actuality until it thinks 
( 429818-24). But in the resolution of the second aporia, Ross would have us believe, Aristotle argues aoainst the 
AA that actual mind doesn't emount to much either, its job being solely to exercise "no disturbing influence" on the 
actual reflections of actual objects of thought "in the mind.” This conception of actual mind as a sort of m irror in 
which other things are actually reflected is consistent with Ross's interpretation of the writing-tablet pessage 
( 429b31 - 430a2), which he construes to say that potential mind "... is like a blank tablet waiting to be written
upon"12 and which he takes es a possible “reminiscence" of the wax mold at Theætetus 191C8.13 In each case 
mind is compered to whet in Aristotelian terms can only be called a substrate: actual mind to a m irror "in" which 
there are actual reflections, potential mind to a wax tablet “waiting to be written upon."
There is, of course, a long-standing alternative interpretation of the writing-tablet passage at 429b31 -  
430a2. The passage comes just after Aristotle has proposed that "the mind is potentially ( δυνάμει) in some way 
the objects of thought but actually nothing (εντελεχεί^ ισ υδέν) until it thinks" (4 2 9 b 3 0 -31). He then 
continues:
... δ<υνάμ>ει δ* οϋτως ώσπερ èv γραμματείψ  φ μηθεν <έν>υπαρχει έντελεχεί<£ 
γεγραμμένον. ( 429b31 -4 3 0 a2 )14
Given Cornford's emendation to δυνάμει, which Ross accepts, the clause is an explication of the δυνάμει in the 
previous line and may be translated literally as follows:
...potentially in this way; es in a writing-tablet to which belongs nothing actually written.
However as Alexander first pointed out, and es many have pointed out since ( notably Rodier, Hicks, and Hamlyn in
this century),15 Aristotle would seem to be comparing potential mind not to the tablet itself, as Ross holds, but to 
what Alexander calls its aptitude ( επ ιτη δ ε ιό τη ?) for being written on, its potential for having actuel writing on 
it. Since Aristotle hes just said that "the mind is potentially in some way the objects of thought but actually 
nothing until it thinks," what it is compared to must be nothing actually until the activity of writing takes place. 
The absence ( but potential presence) of actual writing on the tablet ( το  τής- π ινα κ ίδο? άγραφον) satisfies this
1 1
12
13
14
15
Ross, p. 295.
Ross, p. 41.
Ross, p. 295.
Ross's OCt text with his insertions marked.
Rodier, vol. 11 p. 457 ; Hicks, p. 496 ; Aristotle's De Anime, Books 11 and 11. translated with notes by D.W.
Hamlyn (Oxford, 1968), pp. 138-139.
5condition; the blank tablet itself does not.16 (On this latter view the substrate compared to the writing tablet is 
the human animal itself, with a soul which provides not only the capacity to think--potential mind— but also the 
various perceptive capacities, such es memory, which supply the images "in" which actual mind thinks its objects; 
cf. Γ 7 431 b2). Thus Ross's substrate view of potential mind depends on the less likely of two possible 
interpretations of the writing-tablet passage.
Similarly Ross’s case against the AA based on the m irror analogy for actual mind depends on the reduction of 
Aristotle’s stark Parmenidean dictum το αυτό έσ τ ι τό  νοούν και το νοούμενον at 430a3-4  to the specious
obviousness of the exact reflection view. ( Wedin’s far more Interesting reading of the dictum will be considered in 
the next section. ) Further, by treating the supposed reflection "in" actual mind of the actual object of thought as 
the μεμιγμένον of the second horn of the destructive dilemma at 4 29b27-29 --the  only way to generate a 
conflict with the AA— Ross must overlook the evidence at 430a6-9 that Aristotle himself resolves aporie II within 
the first horn of the dilemma. On Aristotle’s own theory, things that have matter are only potential objects of 
thought (a6 -7 ), so that to them mind will not belong (ωστ* εκείνοι?... σύχυπάρξει νσύζ, a7). For a large and 
important dess of things “other” than mind, those having matter, Aristotle seems to be denying the implication of 
the first horn of the dilemma that H mind is νοητό? μή κατ* άλλο, l.e., simply by virtue of mind’s belonging to 
itself, then these other things will also be νοητά in exactly the same way, by virtue of mind’s belonging to them 
( το ί?  άλλοι? νοΰ? υπάρξει, 429b27). In other words, at 430a7 Aristotle may very well be "breaking" the 
first horn of the destructive dilemma (denying its "if... then...” premise) for things having matter, so that the 
denial of the consequent as ludicrously false (mind does not belong, e.g., to frogs) cannot by what we today call 
modus tollens require the denial of the antecedent of the first horn, that (actual) mind is an object of thought καθ* 
αυτόν (Hicks), i.e. μή κατ’άλλο (429b27).
Unlike his argument against the AA for potential mind based on aporia lb, which fails under the correct 
reading of 429b30- 31, Ross's argument against the AA for actual mind besed on aporie 11 can be made to go 
through, but only at the triple cost of adopting a substrate model of actual as well as potential mind, of trivializing 
Aristotle's τό  αυτό at 430a3, and of overlooking the evidence of a6 -9 , to be developed further below, that 
Aristotle’s own solution to aporia 11 is based on the first ( μή κατ* άλλο) rather than the second ( κατ* άλλο) horn 
of the aporia's central dilemma.
S2. Wedin’s Case against the AA for Potential Mind
In Γ 5, after distinguishing the mind which becomes all things, presumably the potential mind of Γ 4, and 
the mind which makes all things, the so-called νοΰ? ποιητικό? or productive mind, Aristotle says of the latter
that it is χω ρ ιστό? και απαθή? και αμ ιγή? ( 430βΙ 7 - 18 ).17 This clear affirmation of the AA for productive 
mind raises the question whether Aristotle may have restricted the assumption's application, keeping it for 
productive mind but abandoning it for potential mind. In the course of developing an interesting new interpretation 
of productive mind according to which it is identical with the actual mind of Γ 4 ( "The central idea is that In
producing an actual object of thought the mind also produces itself as an actual thing.’’) 18 Michael Wedln has 
recently argued in passing for an affirmative answer to this question. Before turning to Wedin’s arguments against
16 Alexander argues es follows, referring to potential mind as "material mind" ( ό υλικό? νοΰ?)·. ούδεν άρα
τω ν όντω ν ε ν ε ρ γ ε ίς  έσ τ ιν  ό υλικό? νοΰ?, άλλα πά ντα  δυνάμει... επ ιτη δε ιό τη ?  τ ι?  άρα μόνον έσ τ ιν  
ό υλικό? νοΰ? πρό? τή ν  τω ν είδω ν υποδοχήν έοικώ? π ινα κ ίδ ι άγράφψ, μάλλον δε τφ  τη? π ινα κ ίδο? 
άγράφψ, άλλ* ου τή  π ινα κ ίδ ι αύτή. αυτό γάρ τό  γραμματειον ήδη τ ι  τω ν όντω ν έσ τ ιν . δ ιό  ή  μ εν
ψυχή και τό  το ύ τη ν  εχον ε ιη  μάλλον <αν> κατά τό  γραμματειον, τό  δε άγραφον έν αυτή ό νοΰ? ό 
υλικό? λεγόμενο?, ή  επ ιτη δε ιό τη ?  ή  πρό? τό εγγραφήναι. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Anima. 84.21 -
2 2 ,84 .24 -85 .1 . Suoplementum Aristotelicum. Vol II. Part I. ed. Ivo Bruns (Berlin. 1887).
17 Up to this point I heve used the neuter adjectival forms of Γ 4 , 429b23 but will now shift back and forth 
freely between these and the masculine forms of Γ 5 , 430a 17-18.
18 Wedin, p. 172.
6the AA for potential mind, however, I would like to take note of his brief but insightful analysis of Γ 4 , 429b22- 
430a9.
According to Wedin, Aristotle resolves aporie lb by distinguishing thinking from ordinary cases of being 
affected:
The problem [eporia lb] was that, ordinarily, in cases of being affected two actual things are 
involved, a first thing that is affected and 8 second thing that ceuses the first to be affected. In the case 
of mind, however, there is only a single actual thing, for in any episode of thinking the mind is 
actually identical with the object that produces the thinking.... The problem of mind thinking itself 
[aporie II] submits to similar resolution: Since, in the rese of things without matter, mind is
identical with its object, it follows that in such rases mind thinks itself.19
Perception, for example, is in the present respect an ordinary case of being affected: the object of perception ( to 
α ίσθητόν) produces a change in one of the sense organs ( α ισ θητήρ ια ) embodying the perceptive capacity of the 
animal ( το  α ισθητικόν). Prior to the change the perceptive rapacity is potentially “such” (ó tov , B 5 , 418a4; B 
1 1 ,424a 1 ) as the object of perception is actually. Upon perceiving, the α ισθητικόν becomes "like” the 
α ίσθητόν and is now (actually) "such" es it (πεπονθός 8‘ ώμοίω ται καί ε σ τ ιν  ό ΐον εκείνο Β 5 ,4 1 8a5-6 ), 
but though sharing a single activity (Γ 2 , 425b26-27) they remain two entities distinguishable by the matter in 
which they are embodied (cf. B 1 2 ,424a 18-19). In setting up eporia lb, after explicitly stating the AA and the 
assumption that thinking is a case of πάσ χειν , Aristotle adds the implicit assumption that here also what acts 
( produces) and what is acted upon are two distinct things (... άμφόίν..., το  μεν... τό  δε..., 429b25-26). He then 
resolves aporia lb, as Wedin acutely observes, by denying exactly this implicit assumption at 430a3-4. Whereas 
in perception the α ίθητικόν merely becomes “like" (όμοιον B 5 ,4 1 7a20) the α ίσθητόν which produces (cf. B 
5 ,4 1 7b20; B 11,42481 ) the change in it, in the rase of things without matter what thinks and what is being 
thought are the same ( 430a3-4). On this analysis, therefore, Aristotle resolves eporia lb not by rejecting or 
restricting the AA but by weakening the supposed parallel between thinking and perceiving (Γ 4 , 429a13 -1 4 , cf. 
Γ 3 , 427a 19-21).
Much the same holds for aporia II. Once again there is an implicit assumption based on the parallel with 
perception: that there will be objects of thought "other" then mind ( τάλλα , 429b30). If mind is an object of 
thought μη κατ* άλλο but simply by virtue of belonging to itself ( the antecedent of the first horn of the dilemma) 
and these other things are objects of thought in exactly the same way as mind is, then mind will also belong to these 
other things ( tois aXXois vous υπάρξει, 429b27--the consequent of the first horn). In the previous section 
we have considered the possibility that for things having matter Aristotle "breaks" the first horn by affirming its 
antecedent ( mind is an object of thought μη κατ* άλλο) and denying its consequent ( mind does not belong to 
material things other than mind since they are not νοητά, only potential νοητά, 430a6-9). Wedin's analysis 
now permits us to see that Aristotle also "breaks" the first horn for things without matter, though for a different 
reason. In this rase he denies the consequent ( that mind will belong to things other than mind) not because the 
other things fail to be actual νοητά but because here there is no actual νοητόν "other" tiw» ( i.e. distinguishable
by its matter from) actual mind thinking it: in the rase of things without matter what thinks and what is thought 
are the same ( 430a3-4). Thus on Wedin's anelysis Aristotle's τό  αυτό at a3 resolves eporia II es it does aporia 
lb , not by rejecting or restricting the AA but by weakening the supposed parallel between thinking and perceiving.
Wedin's rase against the AA is therefore different from Ross's in at least two ways. First, he believes that 
Aristotle rejected the AA only for potential mind. And second, he does not claim to find any support for this view in 
the eporia and resolution passages themselves. Indeed, as we have just seen, his analyses of aporias lb and II show 
that Aristotle was able to resolve both of these puzzles without rejecting the AA for potential mind. Instead, Wedin 
( I) suggests on the basis of Γ 4 , 429b5-9 that potential mind must undergo modifications and then ( II) argues that 
the AA is incompatible with what Aristotle says about potential mind in Γ 5.
19 Wedin, p. 171.
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The passage ( I ) at Γ 4 , 429b5-9 applies to mind the important distinction made in B 5 between types or 
levels of potentiality and actuality. Aristotle customarily distinguishes between the possession of knowledge 
( lev e l-1) and its exercise (level-2), e.g. at B 1 ,412a22-23. But besides the khower in possession of grammar 
on level-1 and the knower actually thinking about grammar on level-2 there is also the human being, e.g. a child 
(cf. 417b31 ), who is a  “knower" (level-O) only in the minimel sense that he or she belongs to a species whose 
members are cepable of acquiring Jev e l-1 knowledge ( B 5 ,4 1 7a21 -29). The persons et levels-0 and -1 are 
both only potential knowers ( κατά δΰναμιν επ ιστήμ ονες, 4 17β30), but each is so in a different way: the 
level-0 potential knower merely belongs to the right species, whereas the level-1 potential knower is able to 
exercise knowledge at level-2 whenever he or she wants to unless something external interferes (a27-28). 
Aristotle then contrasts the different types of π ά σ χε ιν  involved in the transition from level-0 to level-1 and that 
from level-1 to level-2. In the first transition there is a typical alteration (ά λλο ίω σ ις) involving the 
replacement of one member of a pair of opposites by another ( 417a31 -3 2 , b 2 -3) so that the thing undergoing the 
alteration, e.g. the child, chenges from being unlike to being like (δμοιον) the agent or producer of the change, e.g. 
the schoolmaster, in the relevant respect, e.g. the ability to recognize the letter “A" (cf. 417a20, πά σ χει μεν 
γάρ το άνόμοιον, πεπονθός δ’δμοιόν έστι). In the transition from level-1 to level-2, on the other hand, 
there is e preservation of what isj)otential ( i.e., the level-1 knower) by whet is actual (the level-2  knower),
“...a preservation...of [the] like (ο μ ο ιο ν )in this way as potentiality is related to actuality“ (...σωτηρία..όμοιου 
ούτως ώς δΰναμ ις έ χ ε ι προς εντελέχεια !/, 417b4-5). The latter, Aristotle says, is either a different type 
of alteration or not an alteration at all since ( if one may believe some MSS and most editors) it involves a 
development “into itself" ( e ls  αυτό) and into actuality (4 1 7b6-7).
The application of this to mind at Γ 4 , 429b5-9 runs as follows:
ότα ν  δ’ ούτως έκαστα γ έ ν η τα ι ώς ό επιστήμω ν λ έγ ετα ι ό κατ* ενέρ γε ια ν  (τούτο δε 
συμβαίνει δ τα ν  δύνη τα ι ένερ γε ιν  δ ι’ αύτσυ) έσ τ ι μεν και τό τε  δυνάμει πως, σύ μην 
ομοίως και π ρ ιν  μ α θειν  ή  ευρείν. και αυτός δε αυτόν τό τε  δύνα τα ι νοειν . (Ross: δι* 
αΰτοΐι)
(Since Wedin favors the δε αυτόν of the MSS over Bywater’s δι* αυτοί)2 0 1 will follow him here, as I don't 
believe that the status of the AA is tied to this particular textual Issue.) Hicks translates:
But when the intellect has thus become everything in the sense in which one who actually is a 
[knower] is said to be so (which happens so soon es he can exercise his power of himself), even then 
it is still in one sense but a capacity: not, however, a capacity in the same sense as before It learned
or discovered. And, moreover, at this stage intellect is capable of thinking itself.21
Hence comparable to the distinction between level-0 and level-1 potential knowers at B 5 ,4 1 7a21 -2 9  we now 
have 8 distinction between level-0 potentiel mind, prior to learning and discovery, and level-1 potential mind, 
after learning and discovery. As the passage makes clear, level-1 potentiel mind follows upon the level-2 exercise 
of actual thinking by actual mind: only when mind has become each (o r , on Hicks’ stronger reading of έκαστον, 
all) of the forms which it was potentially at level-0 (cf. 429a29, δυνάμει τά  ε ίδη ) is it subsequently ( και 
τό τε) in potential with respect to that form in the different manner of level-1 ( δυνάμει πως, συ μήν ομοίως). 
But if level-1 potential mind is different from level-0 potential mind, a change of some sort must have occurred 
as a result of learning or discovery. Hence the question arises: how is this change from level-0 potential mind to 
level-1 potential mind to be described? What kind of change is involved?
Wedin argues that the change must consist in "modifications" of potential mind ( "receptive mind", in his 
terminology) due to learning and memory:
20 Wedin, p. 170.
21 Hicks, pp. 131-133.
δNote thet it need not, indeed cannot, be implied that the mind is devoid of all modifications, 
particularly those connected with learning, memory, and the like. How else could the theoretical man 
come to contemplate this rather than that truth? The point rather is that while receptive mind is 
modified, such modifications are no part of its nature. Unlike the physical structures that partially 
define other faculties* natures these modifications in no way set boundary conditions on what the mind 
cando.22
Wedin is undoubtedly correct that the nature of potential mind ( to be capable of thinking, 429a21 -2 2 )  does not 
change in the transition from level-0 to level-1 and hence that the change must consist in "modifications [which] 
are no part of its nature." But modifications fitting this description may be divided into two very different types 
according to whether they are modifications (a) of potentiel mind itself or ( b) of the bodily organs of perception 
(with perception taken broadly to include κοινή ά ΐσθησις, φ αντασία , and memory). On (a) we get what can 
only be called a substrate view of potential mind at least distantly related to Ross’s: besides being receptive 
(429a15 -1 6 )  of a single form at a time in the transition to actual mind actively thinking that form at level-2, in 
the transition from level-0 to level-1 potential mind itself also receives "modifications" (πάθη) which are "no 
part of its nature" (hence accidental to it) and which it can presumably lose when forgetting occurs. According to 
(b ), which is consistent with Alexander’s "aptitude" view of potential mind, the πάθη which constitute learning 
and the memory of νοητά  are πάθη exclusively of bodi ly organs despite the fact that they are a necessary 
condition of potential mind being at level-1 rather than level-0 with respect toa given object of thought (i.e., in 
effect, a necessary condition of the thinker being able to think the object δι* αυτού rather than in some 
adventitious external object, 429b7, cf. 417a27-28). On (a) potential mind changes from level-0 to level-1 in 
the manner of a substrate acquiring πάθη under άλλοίωσις. On ( b) potential mind changes only to actual mind at 
level- 2 in the second ( e is  αυτό) type of πάσχ€ΐν  which Aristotle describes as either not an άλλοίω σις at all or 
adifferent type of ά λλο ίω σ ις (B 5 , 417b6-7); here potential mind is subsequently at level-1 rather than 
level- 0 only if, as a necessary condition, a concommitant accidental άλλοίω σις has occurred in the bodily 
substrate of memory and φαντασία. On (a), which I will call the substrate or complex conception, potential mind 
must be able to receive πάθη and hence cannot be απαθές; so if Aristotle held the complex conception then he 
must have rejected the AA for potential mind. On (b), however, which I will call the simple conception of potential 
mind, the AA can apply to potential mind since the only πάθος involved resides in the bodily sense organs. ( It is 
well to recall here that what is at issue is the applicability of the AA to mind [νο υ ς], not to understanding 
[δ ιάνο ια ] ; insofar es the latter includes imageslr 7 ,4 3  la l 4 -15] it obviously requires a complex conception 
and is not governed by the AA. )
Wedin appears open to the simple conception ( b) of potential mind when he discusses the passage ( 429a29- 
b5) in which Aristotle contrasts potential mind with the perceptive potential embodied in α ισθητήρια: "For all 
other faculties there is something actual even when the faculty is not operative, namely, the particular physical 
structures over which they ere defined. Notice that the mind may well depend on a complex of physical structures, 
sey in virtue of its dependence on images, without being the actualization \ [ i.e., to level-1 ] of any such
structures."23 This would seem to imply that when potential mind is at level-1 the πάθη resulting from learning 
and discovery are actual only as πάθη of the organ(s) of memory. But Wedin appears to embrace the complex 
conception (a) of potential mind when he says that "receptive mind is modified" rather than that it is dependent on 
modifications of the α ισ θ η τή ρ ια  Elsewhere he emphasizes the complexity of his conception of potential mind 
when he compares it to an information retrieval system awaiting a search:
The receptive mind may...be thought of as a kind of memory, not in Aristotle's sense, or a set of 
acquired thoughts or concepts and the producing [by νους πο ιητικός] may be thought of as a kind of
retrieving or, to use Aristotle’s metaphor, as a kind of illuminating of the object( s) of thought.24
22 Wedin, p. 170.
23 Wedin, p. 170.
24 Michael V. Wedin, "Aristotle on the Mechanics of Thought" (Unpublished), p. 21. Subsequent references to 
Wedin are to "Tracking Aristotle’s Noûs," op. c i l . not to this unpublished paper.
9Wedin speaks here of an intellectual memory "not in Aristotle’s sense” because, of course, Aristotle locates 
the memory squarely within the embodied perceptive capacity of the soul. The memory image is a notóos belonging 
καθ’ αυτό to the κοινή α ΐσ θη σ ις or πρώ τον α ισθητικόν ( De Memoria 1 ,450al 0 -1 3 ) and only incidentally 
(κα τά  συμβεβηκός) to mind (του  νου, 13a, Ross's conjecture) or to what is actually thought in the remembered 
image ( τοώ νοσυμένσυ, 13a, the reading of a large family of MSS). Objects of thought are never remembered 
without an image (a t  2 -1 3 ) and then only incidentally; what is remembered καθ’ αυτό is the image itself (a23- 
25). Even in deliberate recollection, where mind is involved in the reasoning process that leads to 8 search for a 
certain image ( 2 , 4 5 3 a 9 -14), Aristotle is emphatic that the πάθος in which the Image sought resides is 
something bodily (...εστϊ. σωματικόν τ ι  τό  πάθος, 453a 14-15).
In his own theory of memory, therefore, Aristotle protects the simple conception of mind ( b), according to 
which the substrate of the πάθη of memory is the bodily sense organ, not potential mind. To the extent that the 
πάθος of memory belongs κατά συμβεβηκός to potential mind, however, then there is at least a relational change 
in the latter sufficient to make potential mind at level-1 dissimilar to potential mind at level-0 ( έ σ τ ι μεν και 
τό τε  δυνάμει πως, συ μην ομοίως..., 429b8). In other words, the complex conception (a) of potential mind is 
wrong inasmuch as it treats potentiel mind itself as the substrate of πάθη. On the simple conception ( b) potential 
mind itself is απαθές but there is a sense in which it "is modified" relationally or incidentally when the πάθη of 
memory, whose substrate is a bodily organ or organs, undergo άλλοίω σις. The plausibility of this simple 
conception ( b) can be seen if we make a rough analog/ between the ability to think ( i.e., potential mind) and the 
ability to play the lyre. Just as no human being can actually think without an image (Γ 7 ,431  al 6 -1 7 , b2 , cf. Γ 
8 , 432a 12-14), so no one can actually play the lyre without a properly strung lyre. Putting strings in one’s lyre 
is e modification or elteretion ( άλλοίω σις) of the lyre, not of the ability to play the lyre, and yet there is an 
interesting dissimilarity between saying of someone that he or she is able to play the lyre before ( level-0) and 
after ( level-1 ) strings have been put in the lyre. Likewise in the case of mind the alteraltion or modification due 
to learning or discovery occurs in the bodily organ(s) of memory, but as a result mind at level-1, after learning, 
is interestingly dissimilar to mind at level-O.
It is potential mind in this respect, as incidentally changed by learning and memory, which Wedin correctly 
describes as "modified" and ”a kind of memory, not in Aristotle’s sense...." In other words, to the extent that he 
adopts a complex conception (a) of potential mind inconsistent with the AA, Wedin is wrong. But on the other hand, 
to the extent that he merely describes the incidental change in potentiel mind which is consistent with the simple 
conception of potential mind ( b) and with the AA, Wedin’s talk of potential mind as "modified" is faithful to Γ 4,
429b5-9.
Wedin’s explicit argument against the AA for potentiel mind (II) is besed on Γ 5 , to which we mey now turn. 
At Γ 5 , 430a 17-19 , Aristotle clearly affirms the AA for productive mind, as follows:.
και ουτος ό νους χω ριστός και απαθής και αμ ιγής, τή  oùoiç ών ενέργεια , άει γάρ 
τ ιμ ιώ τερ ο ν  το ποιούν του πάσχοντος και ή άρχή τή ς  ΰλης.
Wedin translates, lettering the various characteristics for ease of reference:
And this mind is (a) separate...and (b) not capable of being effected...and (ç) unmixed...since (d) in 
its being it is activity, for (e) what acts is elways superior to what is acted upon and the principle to
the matter.25
Acknowledging that characteristics a, b , and ç are discussed in Γ 4, a chapter largely concerned with potential 
mind, Wedin nevertheless argues against the view that a, b, and ç (and hence the AA) apply to potential mind 
( receptive mind, in his terminology):
25 Wedin, p. 182.
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...the fact that Γ 4 has already listed a, t .  end £ among the mind's charactersitics...has inclined a 
number of commentators toward the view that both receptive and productive mind are separate, 
unaffected, and unmixed and that they differ just on the point mentioned in d, that productive mind is, 
additionally, activity. Unfortunately, problems arise here. F irst, the view overlooks the fact that £ 
is given not just as enother, even if distinguishing, feeture of productive mind but rather as the 
reason for productive mind being separate, unaffected, and unmixed. Second, Γ 5 certainly appears to 
deny of receptive mind just these features so how can Γ 4 be supposed to attribute them to it?
Finally, there is Γ 5 ‘s assertion that receptive mine is perishable. If, as Brentano thought, a. k. and£ 
characterized items ere eternal ( a somewhat dubious proposition), then Γ 4 's mind could hardly be 
the same as r  5 's receptive mind. Brentano's rather drastic solution was to deny that the mind that 
becomes all things, what he called the “eufnehmende Vernunft"mb took to be the subject of Γ 4, is the 
same as that which is said to be perishable. Our solution would be to deny that Γ 4 intends in the first 
place to limit itself to receptive mind. Rather the subject of Γ 4 is simply the individual mind of the 
ordinary person and Γ 5 provides a ( partial) account of how it must be organized to function in the 
way it does. So the reason that individual mind is separate, unaffected, and unmixed will be that 
productive mind hes these characteristics.26
Wedin finds three problems in the view (e.g. of Rodier and Hicks) that the AA applies to the potential ( "receptive") 
mind as well as to actual and productive mind, all of them solved, he suggests byhisreinterpretation of Γ 4.
The first problem, according to Wedin, is that Rodier and Hicks fail to treat d as "the reeson for productive 
mind being separate, unaffected, and unmixed.” But it is not clear why this is a problem rather than a result of 
their adoption of an equally plausible reading of the embiguous participial phrase at 430a18. Rodier and Ross read 
d not as en explanation of why productive mind has characteristics a, b, and ç but es part of an argument for the 
conclusion that it does in fact have these characteristics: "Here these predicates are claimed for [productive 
mind], and the clause del γάρ τιμιώτερον... certainly suggests that the [mind] to which they were ascribed in 
C.4 is the [ potential mind], and that a fortiori they belong to the [ productive mind] which, as cause and activity, 
stands higher in the scale of logical priority.”27 In other words, having proved the difficult case in Γ 4, that a, b, 
and ς  apply to potential mind, Aristotle now seves himself a long digression by arguing that a, it, end £ must also 
belong to productive mind since, being in its very essence the activity of thinking (d) for which the former is 
merely the potential, it is more worthy to possess these importent characteristics Ca)· Thus the only real issue 
here is whether Γ 4 ascribes a, b, and ç to potential mind. If it does not, then Rodier and Hicks are reading 
430a 17-19 es en unsound argument with a false implicit premise; if it does, then Wedin is wrong and the AA 
applies to potential mind.
Wedin claims that Γ 4 applies the adjectives χω ρ ισ τός (a) and απαθή? (b) and αμ ιγή? (£) not to 
potential mind but to "the individual mind of the ordinary person.” It is not clear what is to be made of this 
distinction, since potential mind is presumably just the capacity of an individual human being to think. However 
even if we grant Wedin’s contention that ”... the subject of Γ 4 is simply the individual mind of the ordinary person
and Γ 5 provides a ( partial) account of how.1t must be organized [ into productive and potential aspects]... ,"28 it 
does not follow that Aristotle wishes to exclude the potential aspect of mental organization from the force of his own 
statements in Γ 4. Indeed, such a claim does not square with the text. At 429al 5 -1 6  Aristotle says in one breath 
that mind must be άπαθέ? but also "receptive" of form; it is difficult to believe that he would not want the word 
άπαθέ? here to be applied to what Wedin calls “receptive mind," i.e. potential mind. And at 429a24-25 Aristotle 
says that the mind which is nothing in actuality until it thinks should not be regarded as “mixed" with body, 
picking up the ανάγκη... άμ ιγη  e tv a i just above at 429al 8. And finally the conclusion that mind is χω ρ ιστό? at 
429b5 is based on an argument contrasting the perceptive capacity of the soul resident in bodily organs of
26 Wedin, pp. 183-184.
27 Hicks, p. 502, cf. Rodier, p. 462.
28 Wedin, p. 184.
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perception ( 429a29-b5) with the mind that is "potentially the forms" ( 429a29) but lacks any such organ 
(a27). Thus the applicability of the AA to potential mind is textually secure in Γ4.
According to Wedin's second problem, however, "... Γ 5... appears to deny of receptive mind just these 
features... " which Γ 4 is supposed to attribute" to it. Wedin does not expand on this second problem for any of the 
three features a, b, and ç, but if ό παθητικός νους at Γ 5 , 430e24-25 is identified with the potentiel mind of Γ 
4 then Aristotle’s use of the adjective παθητικός might be taken es evidence that he rejected the thesis that 
potential mind is άπαθές (b). This in turn raises the issue of aporia la, which has remained In the background up 
until now:
la How will thinking be possible if ( potential) mind is άπαθές (AA) but thinking is a case of 
π ά σ χ € ΐν τ ι (Ρ )?
As long as απαθές is taken to mean "uneffectable" or "impassible" ( i.e. incapable of π ά σ χε ιν ) then aporia la 
demands abandonment of the AA for potential mind. But is this in fact what άπαθές means in Γ 4 ?  As Rodier
notes,29 from the assumption that thinking is a πά σ χε ιν  τ ι  ( P) or something along the same lines ( τ ι  τοισυτον 
έτερ ο ν), Aristotle in fact infers that mind must then be άπαθές ( άπαθές άρά δ ε ι ε ίν α ι, 429a14 -1 5 ), i.e. 
that in order to be able to think all things (a l 8) potential mind not only must lack eny nature of its own beyond the 
sheer ability to think (a 2 1-22) but also must be without prior qualification (π ο ιο ς  τ ις ,β 2 5 ) . So it is clear 
that in the context of its application to potential mind in Γ 4 άπαθές (a l 5) must mean not “unaffectable", 
“incapable of πάσ χειν ,"  but rather "unaffected", “without πάθος.” Likewise ά π ά θ ε ια at 429a29 should be 
translated "freedom from πά θος” rather than "impassibity." In arguing that the άπάθεια  of the perceptive 
capacity and the άπάθεια  of the noetic capacity ( i.e. potential mind) are dissimilar, Aristotle says that one cannot 
hear well after hearing loud noises whereas one can think even better after thinking a highly intelligible oject 
( 429a31 -b4). The reason, clearly, is that the organ (a30) of hearing retains the πάθος of the loud noise and so 
is unable to teke an the lesser πάθος of of a berely audible sound, whereas potential mind has no bodily organ 
(a27) to receive such a πάθος inasmuch as, under the AA, it is not correctly said to be mixed with body (...ουδέ 
μ εμ ιχθ α ι εύλογον αυτόν τφ  σώματι, a25). Thus aporia la is easily resolved and, once again, Aristotle's 
commitment to the AA for potential mind in Γ 4 is clear.
But what then are we to make of Aristotle's statement at the end of Γ 5 that ό παθητικός νους is perishable 
(430 a2 3 -2 5 )?  If ( 1 ) ό παθητικός νους is identical with the potential mind (Γ 4 , 429a22-29 , b30-31 ; cf. Γ 
5 , 430a11 ) which "becomes all things" ( Γ 5 , 4 3 0 a1 4 -15, cf. Γ 4 , 429a18) and (2 )  potential mind is άπαθές 
(Γ 4 , 42 9 a l5 , a29 -30 ), then (3 ) how can mind as referred to at Γ 5 ,4 3 0 β 2 4 -2 5  be παθητικός?  (This is our 
distilled version of the second problem posed by Wedin to the defenders of the AA for potential mind.) And again, if 
( 1 ) holds es ebove and (2 ‘) potential mind is separable (Γ 4 , 429b5--presumably χω ρ ισ τόν λόγψ) and 
unmixed with body (Γ 4 , 429a24-25) then (3 ’) how can ό παθητικός νους be φθαρτός (Wedin's third
problem)? Following Averroes,30 Brentano proposes to cut the Gordian knot by denying ( 1 ) and identifying ô
παθητικός νους with imagination rather than with potential mind.31 In other words, the AA covers potential
29 Rodier, p. 461.
30 Cf. Arthur Hyman, "Averroes as Commentator on Aristotle's Theory of the Intellect,” in Studies in Aristotle, 
ed. D.J. O'Meara (Washington, D.C., 1981), pp. 161-192, esp. pp. 173, 183-184.
31 Fran2 Brentano. The Psychology of Aristotle ( 1867) edited and translated by Rolf George (Berekely, 1977), 
p. 141: "But what, in our view, is the mental faculty that is capable of being affected [νους π α θητικός]?  It is 
the imagination which, as a sensory faculty according to chapter 4 [429a29] does not partake in the 
impassibility... of the receptive intellect; for this reason book I of the Politics contrasts the sensory pert as the 
“part that can be affected" [παθητικόν μόριον] with the intellectual part [A5, 1254b8].M
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mind but not ό π α θ η τ ικ ο ί voûs. It is not clear why Wedin cells this solution "drastic",32 unless perhaps he 
believes that it stretches the word vo&s far beyond Aristotle's usually more narrow usage.33 Rodier and Hicks, on 
the other hand, affirm ( 1 ), (2 ) , and (2 ')  and attempt to resolve the problems by refusing to concede any real 
conflict between (2 )  and ( 3) or between ( 2 ') and ( 3').34 They thus extend Aristotle's commitment to the AA from 
potential mind to the vous described as παθητικό? and φ θαρτό?, which they take to be identical to it by ( 1 ).
But in doing so they are open to the charge of forcing the sense of 430a23-25 (ου μνημονεΰομεν δέ, ο τ ι  τούτο 
[presumably νοΰ? ποιητικό?] μεν άπαθέ?, ό δε παθητικό? νοΰ? φθαρτό?). Whatever Aristotle may mean 
by ό παθητικό? νοΰ?, the μεν... δέ... construction makes it difficult to believe that he considers it άπαθέ?. 
Wedin’s own solution is to deny ( 2) and ( 2 ') and reject the AA for potential mind, but he must then force the sense 
of Γ 4 , 429a15 -1 6  ( άπαθέ? άρα δ ε ι ε ίνα ι, δεκτικόν δε του ειδου?... ) in order to insist that άπαθέ? there 
does not apply to whet he calls receptive mind.
Given these textual objections to the various positions considered, it may not be remiss to propose, after the 
menner of Republic IV, 432de, that we have had the answer concerning νοΰ? παθητικό? on hand all along without 
recognizing it. At the end of the long discussion of Γ 4 , 429b5-9 we reached the conclusion that Aristotle holds to a 
simple conception of potential mind (consistent with the AA) according to which the memory image is a πάθο? of 
the bodily organ(s) underlying the κοινή ά ϊσθησι? rather than of potential mind itself but that he nevertheless 
recognizes a secondary incidental sense in which potential mind at level-1 differs from potential mind at level-0 
( 429b8) when there hes been an άλλοίωσι? ( change of πάθο?) in memory due to learning or discovery.
Perhaps by è παθητικό? νου? at 430a24 Aristotle means neither potential mind itself ( the pure and simple 
capacity to think which is nothing in actuality at either level-0 or level-1 prior to the occurrence of actual 
thinking at level-2 (Γ 4 ,429824, b 3 0 -3 1 ) nor the perceptive capacity of imagination but rather potential mind 
as incidentally at level-1 rather than level-0 with respect to a given object of thought (the μνημονευτόν κατά 
συμβεβεκό? of De Memoria 1, 450e25) due to there being in memory a πάθο? constituting an image ( the 
μνημονευτόν καθ’ αυτό, a24) of some appropriate sort. Since the existence of an actual πάθο? in memory is 
esssential to potential mind's being at level-1 rather than level-0 (though not, of course, to potential mind 
itself), 6 παθητικό? νοΰ? will not be without πάθο? and hence the AA will fail to hold for it. But for the 
potential mind of Γ 4- -the simple capacity to think which is nothing in actuality at either level-0 or level-1 
( 429a24, b 3 1 ) yet potentially any of the immaterial forms ( 429a29, b30) which actual mind is the same es 
when thinking at level-2 (4 3 0 a3 -4 )--fo r mind in this important sense, the AA will hold.35
32 Wedin, p. 183.
33 Brentano (p. 141 ) seems to have anticipated this objection: “That the imagination, though it belongs to the 
sensitive part, should be call νοΰ? is in no way remarkable. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle once called 
sensation... itself νοΰ? [Z 1 2 ,1 1 43b4], But imagination he often counts with thinking...8S, for example, in 
chapter 3 of De Aniros 3 [ 427b27], and calls it νοΰ? and 8 kind of knowledge [ νό η σ ι? ], as, for exemple, in 
chapter 10 of the same book. 'But it appears,' es he says there, ‘that one of these two is the source of movement, 
either the desire or thinking ( νοΰ?), if indeed one regards imagination as β kind of thought ( ώ? νόησ ίν τ ιν α )
and comprehends it under that name [4 3 3 e9 -10].“
34 Rodier, p. 461; Hicks, pp. 508-509.
35 I wish to express my gratitude to Michael Wedin for giving me a copy of his unpublished paper "Aristotle and 
the Mechanics of Thought" and otherwise graciously accepting the role of attackee; and, especially, to Henry 
Mendell for many helpful conversations and several patient applications of maieutic. Agreement with the views 
expressed above, however, should not be imputed to either of them.
